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By letter of 22 September 1989 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
requested authorization to draw up a report on economic and trade relations 
between the European Community and the EFTA countries in the European Economic 
At-ea. 
At the sitting of 23 october 1989 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that the committee had been authorized to report on this subject and 
that the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security had been requested to deliver 
an opinion. 
At its meeting of 17 October 1989 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
appointed Mr Rossetti rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 16 July 199l it decided to include in its report the following 
motions for resolutions which had been referred to it: 
- motion by Mr Mendes Bota (B3-0231/91) on the negotiations between the European 
Community and the EFTA-countries about the creation of the European Economic 
Are~ (EEA) (opinion: Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and 
Relations with Regional and Local Authorities) 
- motion by Mr Me Cartin and others (83-0053/90) on dumping of Norwegian fresh 
salmon on EC markets (opinion: Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural 
Development) 
At its meetings of'22 April 1992, 16 June 1992, 22 September 1992 and 16 October 
1992 the committee considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution unopposed with 2 
abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Cano Pinto and 
Stavrou, vice-chairmen; Rossetti, rapporteur; Archimbaud, Benoit, da Cunha 
Oliveira (for Dido pursuant to Rule 11(2)), de Vries, Miranda de Lage, 
· Moorhouse, Ortiz Climent (for Suarez Gonzalez), Peijs, Sainjon and Titley (for 
D. Martin). 
The opinion of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media is 
attached to this report. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, the 
Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development and the Committee on 
Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Relations with Regional and Local 
Authorities decided not to deliver opinions. 
The report was tabled on 16 October 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments is noon on Thursday, 22 October. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on economic and trade relations 
between the European Community and the EFTA countries 
in the European Economic Area 
The European Parliament, 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
having regard to the L4xembourg Declaration of 1984 on the strengthening 
of relations between the EEC and EFTA, tJ'le outcome of the EEC-EFTA 
ministerial meetings in November 1988 and M-rch 1989, the statements by 
the President of the Cpmmission, Jacques Deiors, in January and October 
1989 on the need for change in and the better structuring of EEC-EFTA 
relations and the subsequent statements by Vice-President Andriessen on 
the same subject, 
having regard to its resolutions of 13 December 1989 on EEC-EFTA 
relat1ons 1 , of 5 April 1990 on the European Parliament's role in future 
EEC-EFTA negotiations2, and of 14 March 19913 , 14 June 19914 and 14 
February 19925 , all concerning developments in the negotiations on the 
EEA, ' 
having regard to its interim reports of 12 June 1990 on future political 
relations with the EFTA countries and on economic and trade relations 
between the EEC and EFTA6 , 
having r~gard to the o~inions of the Court of Justice of 14 December 1991 
and 10 April 1992 on the draft agreement on the EEA, 
having regard to the agreement establishing the EEA signed on 2 May 1992, 
having regard to Rule 121 of its Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Mendes Bota on the 
negotiations between the European Community and the EFTA-countries about 
the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA} (83-0231/91}, 
OJ No. C 15, 22.1.1990 
See minutes of sitting of 5 April 1990 
OJ No. C 106, 22.4.1991 
OJ No. C 183, 15.7.1991 
OJ No. C 67/196, 16.3.1992 
Does. A3-116/90 on the Community's future political relations with the 
EFTA countries, Jepsen report (OJ No. C 175/49} and A3-146/90 on economi~ 
and trade relations between the European Community and the EFTA countries, 
Rossetti report (OJ No. C 175/52} 
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having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Me Cartin and others 
on dumping of Norwegian fresh salmon on EC markets (83-0053/90), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic 
Relations (A3-0306/92), 
A. whereas the EEC and EFTA countries have historically had principles, 
values and concepts of society in common and these principles and values 
have now become established throughout the continent of Europe, 
B. whereas the EEC is 1:1Y far the most impprtant partner of the EFTA 
countries, accounting for about 60% of thefr foreign trade, and EFTA is 
the EEC's main suppli~r. accounting for more than 25% of non-Community 
imports, 
C. considering the development of trade and cooperation between the two 
parties since 1984, 
D. 
E. 
whereas the EFTA countries and the EEC have repeatedly demonstrated their 
joint desire since 1984, and especially since 1989, to establish more 
structured relations and whereas the process of unification in the 
Community's internal market is accelerating, 
whereas the two parties have shown a growing interest in consolidating and 
extending the framework of cooperation beyond the four freedoms, and this 
in relation to the entirely new problems posed by the turbulent 
development of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, 
F. whereas the changes that have occurred in the East, especially in the last 
two years, have given rise to a situation very different from that 
obtaining at the time the Commission negotiating received its brief, 
G. 
1. 
Whereas the disappearance of the antagonism between the two political 
systems in Europe has created new possibilities in terms of international 
politics for the members of EFTA and has enabled some of them to apply for 
membership of the EC, 
Notes with satisfaction the establishment of a European Economic Area, 
which will create the world's largest integrated economic market and is 
bound further to increase the already extensive trade between the two 
parties and to consolidate the supremacy of the thus integrated new area 
in world commercial relations; 
2. Believes that, in economic terms, both parties are bound to derive 
benefits and advantages from the EEA; 
3. Considers that the agreement represents a significant step forward 
compared with previous free trade agreements between the EEC and the EFTA 
countries, since it will in essence extend the four freedoms of the 
internal market to these countries and broaden cooperation to include 
other important sectors; 
4. Points out, however, that the agreement does not yet establish a customs 
union or an organized single market of the 19 countries and that it does 
not provide for a common policy on foreign trade with third countries, 
which may continue to be subject to - albeit simplified - frontier 
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controls and differentiated commercial policy positions; (notes, on the 
other hand, the will hitherto show by the EFTA countries to join with the 
Community in increasing trade with third countries); 
5. Hopes that the practical implementation of the agreement will create the 
conditions for the establishment of a customs union, a common policy Oh 
trade with third countries and the completion of the internal market, with 
the disappearance of frontier controls; 
6. Believes that the decision of four EFTA countries to apply for membership 
of the European Community must be seen in the context of: 
(a) the new European pol il:ical framework, which has brought an end to the 
distinctive arrangemen:t of two systems divided by economic and military 
pacts and to the reatons for exercising particular care in relations 
between East and West( and 
(b) the fact that the agreement on the EEA entails a high degree of 
integration and obligations for these countries without, however, 
permitting them to play a full part in the future decision-making process 
in the same way as the Community countries; 
7. Emphasizes the importance of the fact that the applications for membership 
were made just as the Community had decided to progress towards Political 
and Monetary Union; 
8. Believes that after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the EC's 
legislation on the organization of the market will be used increasingly 
in support of the common social, industrial and foreign policy and as an 
instrument in achieving the conditions for monetary union and that, in 
this context, the deliberations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee will 
assume an important coordinating role; 
9. Considers that the agreement on the EEA is not at variance with the 
prospect of accession, but forms part of the same process and represents 
a step down this road; 
10. Believes that the derogations from the four freedoms for which the 
agreement provides, though limited, must be temporary in nature and that 
everything possible must be done to ensure that they are withdrawn even 
before the appointed date; 
11. Believes that the absence of any reference to agriculture in the agreement 
(even though existing bilateral agreements on processed agricultural 
products are improved) underlines the difficulty there is in reconciling 
different systems of agricultural support; believes therefore that a 
satisfactory resolution of the agricultural issue within GATT is essential 
if enlargement negotiations with EFTA countries are to succeed; 
12. Regards the bilateral agreements with Austria and Switzerland in the 
transport sector as a compromise resulting from a state of necess 1 ty, 
which is not entirely satisfactory to any of the parties involved; hopes, 
therefore, that this will be a temporary measure and urges the Commission 
to address this problem by taking measures relating to these two countries 
under the policy concerning transport infrastructure of Community interest 
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15. 
after due regard is taken of the unique environmental problems in these 
two countries; 
Notes with satisfaction that the free movement of persons is accompanied 
by the affirmation of principles and the establishment of standards which 
guarantee social security and equal treatment; regrets the absence of 
agreements on the abolition of frontier checks on the free movement of 
persons; calls on the EFTA states to abolish their internal frontier-
controls as a matter of priority; 
Believes that the fr~e movement of capital in the EEA will benefit 
economic integration, ~ut hopes that it will be achieved through effective 
cooperation on monet~ry policy and throu'h new agreements on fiscal 
harmonization; 
Welcomes the introduction of a financial mechanism in support of economic 
cohesion in the EEA, which should be used to help the less-developed 
countries and regions of the Community; urges that the resources for which 
provision has been made be subject to control by the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee; 
16. Believes that one of the most important tasks of the Joint Committee is 
to evaluate the economic impact of the EEA in the partner states and to 
recommend, where appropriate, increased financial aid for the EFTA states 
and structural adjustments to bring those states in line with the 
Community's structural programmes; 
17. Notes with satisfaction that the EFTa countries will be requ1red to speak 
with one voice when dealing with the Community during the implementation 
of the agreement {the 'two-pillar' principle}; 
18. Considers the procedure provided for changing the acquis communautaire, 
integrating the new standards and resolving any disputes to be 
particularly complex and intricate; 
19. Is concerned that these procedures may weaken the European Parliament's 
role and therefore considers it essential to lay down new 
interinstitutional procedures between the Council, Commission and 
Parliament, providing for a constant flow of timely information on the 
drafting of proposals, from the time of their- initial formulation, and on 
any amendments thereto, so that any imbalance to Parliament's disadvantage 
may be avoided; 
20. Underlines that in protection of Parliament's autonomous privileges in 
connection with the legislation procedure for both the Community and the 
EEA the Commission shall be held fully responsible towards the Parliament 
through its standing committees and Plenary Session as foreseen in the 
Rome Treaty. 
21. Believes, moreover, that, in order to pr9tect its privileges, Parliament 
must also deliver an opinion on its possible extension to cover the EEA 
when taking its decision on the Community Act; 
22. Considers that enJargement of the EEA with new countries requires 
Parliament's assent pursuant to Article 238 of the Treaty; 
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23. Considers that the Joint Parliamentary Committee for which the agreement 
provides will enable some useful comparative and investigative work to be 
done on the administration of the EEA and will also be commensurate with 
Parliament's overriding interest in protecting its autonomous privileges; 
calls on the Council to ensure that the President of the EEA Council 
attends meetings of the Joint Parliamentary Committee when it so requestlt 
24. Notes with satisfaction that the agreement provides for the coordination 
of the Community's and EFTA's activities, if in their mutual interests, 
both in international organizations and in their cooperation with third 
countries; 
25. Believes it right that the contracting parties before the end of 1994 
consider which adjustm,nts might be made to the Agreement. 
26. Hopes that this arrangement will open the way to further and closer 
coordination of action in the dealings of the 19 states with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe in particular and with the developing 
countries in general; 
27. Reminds the Member States' governments that prior to any possible 
enlargement of the European Community, the democratic rights of the 
European Parliament must be substantially strengthened, and the decision-
making processes within the Community must become more efficient and 
transparent; 
28. Further hopes that the EEA wi 11 open the way to concerted action to 
address the many problems in the Baltic region; 
29. Points to the fact that in the context of a possible enlargement of the 
EC the Maastricht Treaty provisions will form an integral part of the 
acquis communautaire to be accepted by any applicant country; 
30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission. the 
Council and the EFTA Parliamentary Committee. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
There are two basic prerequisites for an overall, considered appraisal of the 
EEA (European Economic Area} Agreement that avoids biased judgments of or 
piecemeal approaches to the most complex agreement ever concluded by the 
Community: 
(a} 
(b) 
familiarity with and ~ critical interpretation of the agreement and in 
particular of the mech~nisms it has introduped; 
an assessment of the ~hanges that occurred in Europe from the time the 
idea of an EEA was launched until the time the negotiations were 
concluded. Interpreting the agreement in the context of the historical 
and political development of the continent of Europe very much influences 
one's overall assessment of the agreement, which discounts an initial 
assumption that is largely extraneous to the tumultuous changes that have 
occurred in Central and Eastern Europe in the past three years. 
I SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT 
The contracting parties to the agreement signed in Lisbon on 2 May 1992 after 
'more than two years of negotiations are the EEC, the ECSC, the Member States of 
the Community and the Member States of EFTA. It is a mixed-type agreement, 
regulating sectors under the jurisdiction of both the States and the Community 
so that it will have to be ratified or approved by the European Parliament and 
the nineteen national parliaments. 
This should be done before the end of the year so that the agreement can enter 
into force on 1 January 1993. 
The package consists of the agreement proper, containing the general principles 
and provisions; 49 protocols, containing in the main rules for the operation of 
individual sectors; 22 annexes containing all the references needed by the EFTA 
countries to transpose Community legislation, 32 joint declarations clarifying 
points whose interpretation could lead to controversy; and 39 declarations by 
individual parties announcing the existence of problems to which one party or 
one State is particularly sensitive. 
More specifically, the agreement consists of nine parts: 
Part 1 states the aim of the agreement, which is to 'promote a continuous and 
balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Contracting 
Parties with equal conditions of competition, and the respect of the same rules, 
with a view to creating a homogenous European Economic Area'. 
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Part 21 definitely improves the free movement of goods in that it prohibits 
customs duties (including those of a fiscal nature) and equivalent charges, 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, taxes on imported products 
that are of such nature as to discriminate against similar domestic products, 
and repayment of taxes on exported products in order to distort competition. 
There are provisions concerning the adjustment of state monopolies, rules of 
or1g1n, frontier controls and anti-dumping and the safeguard clause. 
Agricultural and fishery products are exceptions to the free movement rule, 
although there is some flexibility and a future developments clause that 
provides for the 'progres!iive liberalization Qf agricultural trade'. An 
undertaking is given to rev~ew the restrictions ,t two-yearly intervals. 
The EEA agreement does not include a common tr,de policy. It provides for 
neither common external customs tariffs nor a cqmmon trade protection policy 
vi s-a-vis third countries. · · 
Part 3 stipulates that 'freedom of movement for workers shall be secured among 
EC Member States and EFTA States' and that there shall be no restrictions on 
freedom of establishment (Article 31), on the provision of services (Article 36) 
or on the movement of capital (Article 40). 
The chapter on transport (Articles 47 et seq.) refers to Annex XIII, the subject 
of a separate agreement between the Ministers of Transport that covers the 
difficult issue of transit through Switzerland and Austria. 
Part 4 defines rules of competition (Articles 53 and 54} very similar to the 
Community ones (Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty). The EFTA States will 
create an independent surveillance authority with powers similar to those of the 
EC Commission as regards competition and jurisdiction over violations of the 
rules of competition (see Articles 53 and 54 and principles laid down in 
Articles 55 to 59). The rules on state aid (Articles 61 to 63) are equivalent 
in practice to Articles 92 e,t seq. of the Treaty of Rome. 
Part 5 lists the principles of social equity (undertaking to improve the working 
conditions and standard of living of workers, particularly with reference to 
safety and health at work; equal pay for men and women and in more general terms 
promotion of equa 1 treatment for men and women, the right of workers to 
information and to be consulted; promotion of the dialogue between the economic 
and social partners at European level and the creation of an EEA Consultative 
Committee analogous to the ESC). 
Reference is also made to the principles of environmental protection, 
harmonization of statistics, consumer protection and company 1 aw, with the 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome or Community legislation being extended to the 
EEA. 
N.B. For a more detailed examination of the four freedoms, rules of 
competition, horizontal provisions concerning social policy, consumer 
protection, environment, statistics and company law as well as cooperation in 
sectors having no bearing on the four freedoms, see the opinion delivered by 
the REX committee on the Foreign Affairs Committee's report. The REX 
committee's opinion is to be regarded as an integral part of this report 
which, for the above sections, merely provides a summary. 
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Part 6 defines the cooperation procedure for framework programmes, specific 
programmes and other Community projects in various sectors (Article 78: R&O, 
information services, education, training and youth, SMEs, tourism, the audio-
visual sector, civil protection, as well as the environment, social policy and 
consumer protection, already considered from the point of view of promoting the 
four freedoms). Cooperation will take the form of a contribution by the EFTA 
states to financing and management and a share in the benefits of Community 
projects. 
PART 7: INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STRUCTURE OF THE ASSOCIATION: Provision is made f9r an institutional structure 
based on an EEA Council, a ~oint Committee for the management of the EEA, a 
Joint Parliamentary Committe~ and a joint Economic and Social Committee. 
(a) 
(b) 
The EEA Council (Article 89) meets twice a year to lay down the general 
political guidelines to be followed by the EEA Joint Committee. It 
consists of the members of the Council and the Commission and one member 
of each EFTA government. 
Article 90(2) provides the first key to the decision-making mechanism: 
decisions by the EEA Council 'shall be taken by agreement between the 
Community on the one hand and the EFTA states on the other'. 
The EEA Joint Committee manages the EEA or, more precisely (Article 92) 
'shall ensure the effective implementation and operation of this 
Agreement', takes decisions and exchanges information and opinions. It 
consists of the contracting parties to the agreement. Here too decisions 
are taken by agreement between the Community on the one hand and the EFTA 
States on the other, but, and this is important, the EFTA States must 
speak with one voice (Article 93). 
This then confirms the principle of two pillars, each of which works out its 
own decisions autonomously; so that decisions can then be adopted in the EEA, 
there must be substantial convergence or identity of views on both sides. 
This expedient safeguards the autonomy of decision-making of the Community which 
will thus be able to take decisions according to its own procedures. And on the 
other hand EFTA's autonomy is also safeguarded: although it has broadly accepted 
the existing Community legislation, it does not consider it can confine itself 
. to si mp 1 y accepting Commu'n ity decisions in the future. 
But it would seem that this mechanism, albeit unexceptionable in formal terms, 
will not be easy to implement in practice. What can be done to ensure that 
legislators on all sides arrive at the same decision that can be applied in the 
EEA? 
The fact that the EFTA countries must speak with one voice is an innovation 
since, unlike the Community, the free trade association has no supranational 
prerogatives and its summits are confined to intergovernmental cooperation. It 
was in fact the European Parliament that called for the EFTA states to speak 
with one voice since it ~s unthinkable that, given its size and prerogatives, 
the Community should always undertake to negotiate an agreement in the EEA with 
seven different partners, each with its own views. 
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The fact that the EFTA countries now have to speak with one voice is thus to the 
credit of the agreement. The practical consequence of this is that the 
executive structures of the association have been strengthened with the creation 
of a standing committee of the EFTA countries consisting of one representative 
of each government to guarantee the homogeneity of decisions arrived at on the 
EFTA side. 
On the other hand, consideration has also to be given to the possibility that 
someone on the Community side of the Joint Committee could give a unilateral 
interpretation of Community decisions adopted autonomously and in accordance 
with the prescribed procedures. An EEC regulation will be adopted, specifying 
that it is the Commission t~at expresses the Com~unity's official views. 
(c) The EEA Joint Parliam~ntary Committee provided for in Article 95 and 
governed by Protocol 36 has the task of contributing 'through dialogue and 
debate, to a better understanding between the Community and the EFTA states' 
in the fields covered by the agreement. It consists of 66 members, 33 from 
the EFTA side and the same number of MEPs on the Community side. As a 
general rule it holds two meetings a year, alternately in a Community state 
and in an EFTA state. 
To get back to prerogatives, the EP had maintained that the task of the joint 
parliamentary delegation should be 'to enable proper democratic control to be 
exercised by the EP and by the parliaments of the EFTA countries' (resolution 
adopted on 14 June 1991}. This wording does not appear in the agreement. 
However, the views expressed on the subject in the letter of 20 December 1991 
from the chairman of the REX Committee and your rapporteur to the President of 
the EP following a wide-ranging debate on working document PE 155.068 are valid. 
To quote some passages from the letter: 
'As regards interparliamentary cooperation, Article 106 (now 95) and Protocol 
36 differ from Parliament's resolution of 14 June 1991 which tackled this 
argument in the following points: 
1. In respect of the task of enabling proper d~mocratic control to be exercised 
by the European Parliament and the EFTA Interparliamentary Committee, 
Article 106 (now 95) provides for the promotion of better mutual 
understanding between the two parties 'through dialogue and debate'. This 
is a rather general policy statement; but although the wording of the article 
is different from that of Parliament's resolution it does not conflict with 
Parliament's main concern, which was not to lose its prerogatives. 
2. The article makes no explicit reference to the possibility of inviting 
Ministers, Members of the Commission and officials for discussions, but does 
provide that the President of the EEA Council may appear before the Joint 
Committee. It should be made explicit, if only in a Council declaration that 
would serve as an authentic interpretation of the text, that this may also 
occur at the request of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. 
3. While the resolution provided that the Joint Parliamentary Committee should 
convey its views in a report to the European Parliament and the EFTA 
Interparliamentary Committee, Article 106 (now 95) provides for the wider and 
more structured possibility of expressing views through reports or 
resolutions and for consideration of the annual report which the EEA Council 
is obviously required to produce. 
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In conclusion, although the wording of the article does not coincide with 
Parliament's, it does not seem to affect what has been Parliament's main 
preoccupation, safeguarding its prerogatives, and consequently rejecting any 
delegation of those prerogatives to the Joint Parliamentary Committee'. 
Any further comment is unnecessary. 
(d) The EEA Consultative Committee is concerned with cooperation between the 
economic and social partners. It is composed of 'equal numbers of, on the 
one ~and, members of the ESC of the Community and, on the other, members of 
the EFTA Consultative Co~mittee' (Article 96). It expresses its views in 
the form of reports or r~solutions. 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE 
COMMUNITY LEGISLATION. The fact that the EFTA countries are to assimilate 
Community legislation on the four freedoms and horizontal policies means that 
three quarters of Community legislation (some 1500 directives, regulations and 
decisions) will become part of their legal system. The transposition work 
should be completed by 31 December 1992 so that the agreement can enter into 
force on 1 January 1993. 
AMENDMENT OF LEGISLATION. The agreement specifies that the rules applicable in 
the EEA must be homogeneous. This applies not only to existing legislation 
involving the transposition of Community legislation by the EFTA countries but 
also future legislation. 
Here the problem has arisen of safeguarding the decision-making autonomy of the 
contracting parties without twarting the objective of legislative homogeneity. 
The problem has been resolved through a complex process involving continuous 
information and consultation by the parties from the drafting stage onwards, as 
laid down in Article 99, and in Article 100 in the case of certain measures. 
The procedure is as follows: 
- As soon as new legislation is being drafted, the Commission informally 
consults experts from the EFTA states in the same way as it consults experts 
from the Member States; 
-When transmitting the proposal to the Council, the Commission also transmits 
it to the EFTA states; 
- At the request of one of the contracting parties, a preliminary exchange of 
views takes place in the EEA Joint Committee; 
-During the stage preceding the EC Council's decision the parties consult each 
other and continuously exchange views in the EEA Joint Committee; at all these 
stages they are required to act in good faith in order to facilitate the 
adoption of decisions by the EEA Joint Committee. 
Article 100 confirms the important role of the experts. 'The EC Commission 
shall ensure experts of the EFTA States as wide a participation as possible ... 
in the preparatory stage of draft measures to be submitted subsequently to the 
committees which assist the EC Commission in the exercise of its executive 
powers ... on the same basis as it refers to experts of the EC Member States'. 
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The European Parliament is not consulted by the Commission on its proposals but 
by the Council. This means that Parliament will be able to take cognizance of 
and state its views on proposals only after the experts of 9 countries and the 
Commission have completed all the consultations and exchanges of views necessary 
for a decision. 
Unless we want to end up with the paradox of proposals being submitted to the 
experts {and thus the governments) of non-Community countries before being 
submitted to the European Parliament, a number of new points must clearly be 
made: 
1. The EP must be kept constantly informed of legislative proposals being 
drawn up from the outset and not merely when they arrive at the Council, which 
then consults Parliament. Without a constant flow of information including 
developments during the Commission's drafting of proposals and any discussions 
in the Joint Committee immediately after the act is forwarded to the Council and 
the EFTA governments, there is a danger that Parliament's opinion will become 
a pure formality and totally ineffective given that a political agreement was 
reached as early as the drafting stage. Or the case could arise of the Joint 
Committee agreeing to chang.e a proposal not yet adopted by the EC Council but 
with the Council's assent to the amendment. In this case the EP could find 
itself discussing a proposal that has in fact lapsed without Parliament knowing 
anything about it. All this means that it is essential to devise new 
inter-institutional procedures, otherwise further disequilibrium would arise to 
the detriment of the EP. 
2. In order to safeguard another aspect of its prerogatives, the EP should, 
when delivering its opinion on Community legislation, also state its views on 
possibly extending the legislation to cover the EEA. Otherwise a measure which, 
given its external repercussions, would normally presuppose the conclusion of 
an international agreement by the Community and thus be subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny, would bypass Parliament. 
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NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE INTEGRATION OF NEW LEGISLATION 
In order to guarantee legal homogeneity and substantial concomitance of the 
entry into force of new legislation or of amendments to existing legislation: 
the Community must, when adopting the act, immediately forward it to the EEA 
Joint Committee; 
- the Joint Committee must take a decision on its extension to the EEA as soon 
as possible. 
This presupposes agreement from the EFTA side. If there is an agreement, there 
is no problem. If there is no agreement or if the subject matter comes under 
the jurisdiction of the parl}aments of the EFTA states, the agreements provides 
for the following procedures: 
1. Every effort must be made to find a mutually acceptable solution in the 
case of an issue which falls within the legislative competence of the EFTA 
countries; 
2. If this path cannot be followed, the Joint Committee must examine all 
further possibilities to maintain the 'good functioning' of the agreement, 
including possible recognition of the equivalence of legislation. A decision 
must be taken within six months of the date of notification of the problem o~ 
of entry into force in the Community; 
3. If at the end of six months (see 2. above) the new legislation has not been 
adopted, the annex or part thereof amended is regarded as suspended and every 
effort must be made to find a solution so that the suspension is terminated as 
soon as possible; 
4. The pract i ea 1 consequences of the suspension must be examined and the 
necessary adjustments made by the Joint Committee. 
In each of these four processes the Commission and the Council, which sit on the 
Joint Committee exercise discretionary powers that could have repercussions for 
the Community measure adopted. In no case is any mention made of whether or how 
the EP is to be informed of such intervention. 
Here too there is a shift in the interinstitut1onal balance to the detriment of 
the EP. 
Possible suspension of the annex whose amendment has not been approved concerns 
only the EFTA countries and not the Community because the Community measure is 
formally perfect. 
SAFEGUARD MEASURES The unilateral safeguard measures provided for in the 
event of serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties must be 
restricted with regard to their scope and duration and, save in exceptional 
circumstances which require immediate action, must be notified in advance to the 
EEA Joint Committee and discussed therein. For the Community, the safeguard 
measures are adopted by the Commission. 
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SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
HOMOGENEITY To resolve the problem of legal homogeneity, the Joint Committee 
has been assigned the task of keeping under constant review the case law of the 
Court of Justice and the EFTA court. If the Joint Committee has not succeeded 
1n resolving differences in case law within two months, the procedure fot' 
settling disputes may be initiated. 
SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE The EFTA states are to establish an independent 
survei 11 ance authority and an EFTA Court of Justice competent for actions 
concerning the surveillanc~ procedure regarding the EFTA states, appeals 
concerning decisions in the field of competition initiated by the surveillance 
authority and the settlement of disputes between EFTA states. 
The EFTA Surveillance Aut~ority and the Commission cooperate, exchange 
information and consult eac~ other on complaints concerning the fulfilment of 
obligations arising from th~ Agreement. If the two parties disagree on the 
response to be made to a complaint, the Joint Committee may initiate 
proceedings. 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES In the event of a dispute the Community or an EFTA 
state may bring the matter before the Joint Committee. If the dispute has not 
been settled within three months, the parties may by common accord bring the 
matter before the Court of Justice of the Community. If, however, no settlement 
has been reached within six months or if the parties have not agreed to ask the 
Court of Justice for a ruling, one party may adopt safeguard measures or suspend 
that part of the Agreement over which the dispute has arisen. Finally, disputes 
over certain issues (scope or duration of safeguard measures, proportionality 
of rebalancing measures} may be referred to arbitration. 
The theory of the two pillars is confirmed, but the system is so complex as to 
raise doubts about how efficiently it can function. 
FINANCIAL MECHANISM 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COHESION 
Article 115 of the Agreement contains an important statement of principle on the 
subject of economic and social cohesion: 'The contracting parties agree on the 
need to reduce the economic and social disparities between their regions'. 
While the undertaking is still based on the objective of promoting a continuous 
and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations, what counts is the 
practical consequence: the EFTA states are to establish a financial mechanism 
in the context of the EEA designed, in conjunction with Community initiatives, 
to bring about cohesion. 
The financial mechani'sm has an endowment of ECU 1'.5 m for 3% interest rebates 
on loans granted by the EIB and ECU 500 m in the form of direct grants. The 
total endowment will be spread over five years, starting from 1993. 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal, some regions of Spain and Ulster will receive 
assistance for projects concerning the environment, transport and education and 
training; the main recipients will be SMEs. 
A delicate institutional problem arose during the negotiations: that of the 
Community's decision-making autonomy on cohesion issues, which was leading to 
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I the exclusion if EFTA from fora in which the Commission takes decisions on 
Community aicl."-for seriously underdeveloped regions; at the same time there was 
the problem.:O'f cohesion between intervention by the EFTA financial mechanism and 
Community 4nitiatives. The problem was resolved as follows: the financial 
management will be entrusted to the EIS but decisions will be subject to 
approval by a special EFTA committee and to the Commission's opinion. In the 
case of direct grants, provision is made for the recipient states to submit 
proposals and for the procedure of approval by the EFTA special committee and 
an opinion from the Commission as described above2 • 
THE NEW HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND TO THE AGREEMENT 
The Luxembourg Declaration of 1984 which initiated a pragmatic strengthening of 
cooperation between the EEC: and EFTA provided an incentive for the EFTA 
countries to have a more bin1ing and more structured form of relations with the 
Community. · 
The enlargement of the Community, the greater degree of integration prompted by 
the Single Act and the move towards a single market caused considerable concern 
and repercussions in the EFTA countries. The Community proved to be very 
attractive to operators and capital in the free trade area. This led to worries 
in the mid-1980s about a 'fortress Europe' that would be able to lay down its 
own terms to the European market's other western partners. 
Thus arose the ca'l for the extension to EFTA of some of the objectives the 
Community was setting itself as regards the four freedoms and ancillary 
policies. The first opening, albeit limited, was provided by the agreement 
reached in Geneva in November 1988. In January 1989 the President of the 
Commission, Mr Delors, voiced the need for a change in EEC-EFTA relations and 
advanced two possibilities: further strengthening of bilateral relations between 
the Community and individual EFTA countries or a new, more structured, type of 
institutional agreement. 
The subsequent debate revealed the basic questions prompted by the second Oelors 
alternative: 
Was EFTA willing to accept an agreement based on two pillars? 
- Was it willing to accept not only the advantages of possible liberalization 
of the market but also the cost and the terms involved? 
- Was it prepared to cooperate in other sectors too and to embark on joint 
discussion of foreign and security policy? 
-How could more structured relations be established with EFTA and at the same 
time the Community's decision-making autonony be safeguarded? 
The summit of EFTA Heads of State in March 1989 expressed a willingness to take 
on these commitments and the EFTA Council in June confirmed it. 
Speaking before the Council of Europe in October that year, Mr Oelors put 
forward the possibility of a Europe with several concentric circles: firstly, 
the Community, and then the larger but less binding political and institutional 
2 The financial mechanism is governed by Protocol 38 
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circle represented by the EEA. In reality there was a third circle comprising 
Central and Eastern Europe where - following the joint declaration of mutual 
recognition by the EEC and COMECON in June 1988, countries were opening up to 
cooperation links with the Community. 
The negotiations that began with EFTA in mid-1990 took place to this background. 
The Commission's negotiating mandate had well-defined parameters that took 
account of the political context, and the agreement now before Parliament must 
be seen in the light of what inspired it three years ago. 
The outlook for the EFTA countries at that time included participating in the 
benefits of the internal mar~et while safeguardfn~ their autonomy and above all 
their special position on th' international scene; mainly as neutral states not 
as a general rule bound by irl'ternational alliances, solidly attached to Western 
democratic values but activ«t in the policy of good-neighbourliness and quite 
prepared to cooperate with tne countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
The co 11 apse of the systems in the countries of Centra 1 and Eastern Europe 
weakens the historical and political arguments that prompted the EFTA countries 
to take a cautious and neutral stance on the international scene; on the other 
hand the problems of a radical reconstruction of the countries of Eastern Europe 
calls for greater cooperation and integration between the countries of Western 
Europe. 
The recent far-reaching changes on the European political scene and the fact 
that the agreement gives the EFTA countries only a minor role in the EEA's 
decision-making process have prompted four of the EFTA countries to apply for 
accession to the Community. The fact that they want to join a Community that 
decided in Maastricht to move on to political union and EMU and to adopt a new 
approach to common defence and security issues is a measure of the profound 
political changes that have occurred. 
This means that the agreement on the EEA has lost some of the political validity 
that it might have had three years ago. The agreement has assumed the form of 
a transitional phase which at least the four applicant EFTA countries are trying 
to shorten as much as possible. 
This does not detract from the merits of the agreement, which creates a much 
more solid basis for trade and cooperation between the Community and the EFTA 
countries than exists at present; it represents a step that wi 11 faci 1 it ate 
their entry into the Community. The formal accession of the applicant countries 
to the Community will not take place in the immediate future and so the EEA will 
have favourable repercussions at least as regards trade and economic relations 
between the two parties and, it is to be hoped, on the coordination of measures 
to assist the countries of Eastern Europe and the developing countries. 
Your rapporteur does not share the view that the agreement is an opportunity not 
taken by the Community to define a broader European strategy that includes the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is quite true that the strategy is 
taking shape with difficulty, and the complex mechanism introduced in the form 
of the EEA is unlikely to become an institutional point of reference for the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
But it would be wrong to blame the agreement for the general (and objective} 
difficulty of redrawing the institutional map of a Europe that extends to the 
Urals. 
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Annex I 
13 March 1991 83-0231/91 
MOTION FOR A RESOLPTION 
tabled pursuatn to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr MENDES BOTA 
on the negotiations between the European Community and the EFTA 
countries about the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
The European Parliament, 
1. 
2. 
having regard to the ongoing negotiation between the European Community and 
the EFTA countries about the creation of the European Economic Area which 
should be concluded on 30 June 1991; 
having regard to Article 130a under the title 'Economic and Social 
Cohesion' of the EEC Treaty stipulating that the Community'( ••• ) shall aim 
at reducing disparities between various regions and the backwardness of the 
least-favoured regions.'; 
Welcomes EFTA's readiness and the twelve EC Member States' receptive 
response to the possible establishment of an autonomous fund financed by 
the EFTA-countries and directed to the backward regions of the European 
Community; 
Considers that the EFTA fund should complement the Community's structural 
funds in such a way that it focuses mainly on housing, health, education, 
environment and productive investments; 
3. Calls on its responsible committees to elaborate two studies one on the 
possible functioning and effectiveness of the EFTA fund, the other on the 
consequences which will derive from the creation of the European Economic 
Area for the economic sectors and geographic regions in the Community. 
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Annex II 
15 January 1990 83-0053/90 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by the following m~mbers: Me CARTIN, BANOTTI, CUSHNAHAN and COONEY 
on dumping of Norwegian fresh salmon on EC markets 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas the Norwegian Central Sales Organization operates a concerted 
pricing strategy in EC markets; 
B. whereas this pricing strategy amounts to dumping of Norwegian salmon on EC 
markets and is to the serious detriment of EC salmon producers and 
processors, particularly those in Ireland and Scotland; 
c. whereas the trends in Norwegian prices and exports, since 1988 (Norwegian 
production has grown at 7~~ p.a. since 1987) point clearly to a concerted 
effort to expand the Norwegian market share at the expense of EC producers; 
o. whereas the Commission is investigating the Norwegian strategy; 
1. Strongly supports the Irish and Scottish case for the safeguard clause 
under Article 24 of EEC Regulation 3796/81 to be invoked in the current 
serious market situation; 
2. Believes that the Commission should act immediately on this matter to 
safeguard current Community and private sector investment in salmon 
production, processing and marketing both in Ireland and Scotland; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and 
the Council. 
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